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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS V MUNICIPALITIES: WHO PAYS
WHEN THE POLICE- WILL NOT RESPOND 9
The problem of domestic violence is often exacerbated by the
failure of the police to take appropriate action. When the police
fail to respond, the victims of domestic violence may bring an
action against the police department or municipality involved
for violation of the victim's equal protection or due process
rights. The author critically examines both claims, setting forth
a theoretical framework for such claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Domestic Violence
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE1 IS the most common type of assaultin this country 2 With an estimated three to four million Amer-
ican women abused by husbands or intimate partners each year,3
1. Throughout this note, the term "domestic violence" will be used to describe vio-
lence between intimate partners who live or have lived together. Intimate partners include
husbands and wives, common law spouses, live-in lovers, ex-spouses, and ex-lovers.
2. For instance, in Shaker Heights, Ohio, approximately 94% of all assaults reported
in 1987 were domestic assaults. SHAKER HEIGHTS POLICE BULLETIN, WEEK 53 (1988)
(summary of part I crimes for 1988). In 1974 the Boston City Hospital reported that
approximately 70% of the assault victims received in their emergency room were women
assaulted in their homes; in Atlanta, 60% of all police calls on the night shift were domes-
tic disputes. D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 12 (1976).
3. Dzik, Abuse at Home: National Domestic Violence Awareness Month, Wash.
Post, Oct. 10, 1989, at C5, col. I (citing the National Clearinghouse on Domestic Vio-
lence). The great majority (almost 97%) of reported domestic violence victims are women.
Case Comment, Gender Based Discrimination in Police Reluctance to Respond to Domes-
tic Assault Complaints, 75 GEO. L.J. 667, 671 n.20 (1986). In light of the statistics, vic-
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domestic violence has become the primary cause of injury to
women in the United States. Domestic assaults typically become
more frequent and severe as time passes, sometimes ending in
murder.5 According to FBI crime reports, thirty percent of all fe-
male homicide victims are killed by their husbands or boyfriends.'
The risk of extreme violence can be even higher when the victim
attempts to leave the abusive relationship.7
In many cases, police receive several calls for help before the
violence reaches a homicidal level. In fifty percent of the homi-
cides between domestic partners in Kansas City, Missouri, for in-
stance, police had been called to the house five or more times prior
to the killing.8 Police reluctance to intervene can mean death, kid-
naping, rape, or torture for the victim.
Prompt police intervention, including arrest9 of the abuser,
has several benefits. Arrest can break the violent cycle and de-
crease future violence. In a study comparing various methods of
police response in domestic violence cases, the Minneapolis Do-
mestic Violence Experiment found that arrest was the most effec-
tive of three standard methods police used to reduce domestic vio-
lence.10 The other police methods-attempting to counsel both
tims and plaintiffs will be referred to using feminine pronouns throughout this note. This
usage is not intended to deny or denigrate the existence of male victims of domestic
violence.
4. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, The Abused Woman: Fact
Sheet (Jan. 3, 1989).
5. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN.. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. PROSECUTOR'S
RESPONSIBILITY IN SPOUSE ABUSE CASES 3 (1980); see L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WO-
MAN 55-70 (1979).
6. Dzik, supra note 3, at CS, col. 1.
7. The number of women killed by abusive partners has risen in 35 states; in 25 of
those states, more than half the women were killed after they had separated from or di-
vorced their partners. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND
How SOCIETY RESPONDS 65 n.* (1989).
8. POLICE FOUND., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE, STUDIES IN DETROIT
AND KANSAS CITY 9 (1977), cited in Comment, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence,
II HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 215-16 n.18 (1988). Similarly, 50% of the murders in New-
port News, Virginia, involved family members. "In half of those cases," the police had
previously responded to complaints of domestic violence. Lang, How to Stop Crime the
Brainy Way, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jul. 21, 1986, at 55, 55.
9. Throughout this note, "arrest" as advocated in domestic violence cases means
arrest whenever probable cause exists. Many states' statutes specify that a victim's state-
ment that she has been abused is sufficient probable cause for arrest. See generally
Lerman, Protection of Battered Women: A Survey of State Legislation, 6 WOMEN's RTS.
L. REP 271, 282-83 (1980) (comprehensive survey of state legislation).
10. Sherman & Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, POLICE
FOUND. REP., Apr. 1984, at 6, cited in Comment, supra note 8, at 215 n.16.
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parties (mediation)11 and sending assailants away from home for
several hours-were found to be considerably less effective in de-
terring future violence. 2 An approach that favors arrest also
sends a strong message to the batterer that such violence will not
be tolerated by the community Finally, the willingness of police
to take serious action directly affects the victim's perception of her
ability to escape from the violence.1 3
Because domestic violence is such a significant source of in-
jury to women in this country and because police action has been
shown to dramatically reduce the danger to those abused, victims
and their advocates have been frustrated by the long-standing po-
lice reluctance to respond effectively to domestic calls. 4 Although
all states have passed laws criminalizing domestic violence,15 po-
lice have generally resisted enforcing these laws.' Formal or in-
formal departmental policies often reinforce the idea that domes-
I1. Mediation is a method of dispute resolution widely used by police in responding
to domestic calls. At one time it was promoted as a "sensitive" method of handling m-
trafamily disputes. However, when violence or the threat of it is part of a dispute, most
experts believe that mediation is an ineffective and inappropriate response. Mediation at
the time of the attack is ineffective because it presupposes that the two parties are equals.
In an abuse situation, the victim is weaker and powerless. Moreover, mediation is inappro-
priate because it requires the powerless victim to share in the blame of the attack. Fields,
Wife Beating: Government Intervention Policies and Practices, in BATTERED WOMEN: IS-
SUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 228, 251-52 (United States Comm'n on Civil Rights ed. 1978)
(statement of Marjory Fields); see also L. WALKER, supra note 5, at 64-65 (temporarily
calming down the assailant does not prevent subsequent abuse).
12. Sherman & Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Vio-
lence, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 261, 261 (1984) (scope note).
13. For a discussion of how police arrest of batterers may empower women, see Ep-
pier, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them
When the Police Won't? 95 YALE L.J. 788, 808-09 n.84 (1986) (if society views domestic
violence as a public rather than a private matter, the police will arrest the abusers, and
victims will believe they have the power to stop the abuse by calling the police); Comment,
supra note 8, at 223-24 (by arresting the assailant, the victim feels that society values her).
14. "A study of domestic violence cases in Milwaukee found that while 82% of vic-
tims requested that the batterer be arrested, arrest occurred in only 14% of the incidents."
Eppler, supra note 13, at 788-89 n.3 (citing Bowker, Police Services to Battered
Women-Bad or Not So Bad? 9 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 476, 485-86 (1982)).
15. See generally Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21
HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 61, 62 n.l (1984) (listing recent enactments providing remedies to
victims of domestic abuse).
16. See generally Note, Domestic Relations: Legal Responses to Wife Beating: The-
ory and Practice in Ohio, 16 AKRON L. REV. 705, 724-25 (1983) (police continue to resist
arresting domestic violence offenders despite a new statute); Comment, supra note 8, at
214-15 (noting police resistance to arresting batterers and calling for more states to pass
mandatory arrest laws); Comment, Spouse Battering and Ohio s New Domestic Violence
Legislation, 13 TOLEDO L. REV. 347, 362-63 (1982) (discussing shortcomings in Ohio's
new criminal domestic violence law).
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tic violence is a low priority in law enforcement efforts. For
instance, some police department policies specify a lower priority
for responding to domestic assaults or state that the primary goal
of any police involvement is to get the parties to "cool down"
rather than to arrest the abuser.17 Also, police officers often fail to
file reports or pursue investigations after receiving domestic vio-
lence calls.'
B. Growth of Section 1983-Suits
As a result of police reluctance to enforce legislation
criminalizing domestic violence,19 victims have turned to the use
of litigation, bringing suits against both police departments and
municipalities employing police officers who have failed to take
proper action. This litigation typically has aimed both at produc-
ing changes in police department policies2 ° and at providing a
remedy for victims injured by police inaction."
Such suits could not be raised under section 198322 until
1978, coincidentally the year in which the first criminal domestic
violence statutes were proposed. In Monell v Department of So-
cial Services,23 the Supreme Court reversed its previous rule that
17. One policy previously followed by police in Michigan advised officers to "'a.
Avoid arrest if possible. Appeal to their vanity. d. Explain that attitudes usually
change by court time. e. Recommend a postponement. 1) Court not in session. 2) No judge
available.'" Eppler, supra note 13, at 790 n.12 (quoting Eisenberg & Micklow, The As-
saulted Wife: Catch 22 Revisted, 3 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REV. 138, 156-57 (1977) (citing
INTERNATIONAL ASs'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, TRAINING KEY No. 16, Handling Distur-
bance Calls 94-95 (1968-69);*'WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF. POLICE TRAINING ACADEMY: Do-
MESTIC COMPLAINTS Outline 2-3)); see East Cleveland Policy/Procedure: Domestic Vio-
lence and Family Disputes 2-4 (1988) (arrest of the abuser is viewed as a last resort).
18. In 1985, there were 64,443 reports of domestic disputes in Ohio. No action was
taken in 41,829 of these. Ohio Att'y Gen, Domestic Disputes by County and Agency
(1985) (statistical summary).
19. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. One justification for not enforcing
legislation is police cynicism about whether the victim will press charges. See Case Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 689. However, failure to arrest the batterer only makes it more
difficult for a victim to bring a complaint. For a more detailed discussion of reasons police
typically refuse to intervene, see id. at 687-90.
20. See, e.g., Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901
(1979) (seeking to compel a change in a municipal police department's domestic violence
policy and to prevent clerks of family courts from discouraging pursuit of legal remedies in
domestic violence cases).
21. For a discussion of recent suits seeking remedies for serious injuries, see infra
notes 38-40, 144-52 and accompanying text.
22. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
23. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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municipalities were not liable under section 1983.24 The Court
held that a better reading of this statute was to consider munici-
palities "persons" liable for their actions. 5 Since that time, an
increasing number of plaintiffs have sought to use section 1983 as
a means to redress wrongs and injuries inflicted by municipal
officials.26
Recovery under section 1983 is predicated upon a showing of
a deprivation of a constitutional right27 by a person acting under
color of state law 28 Domestic violence victims usually claim a
deprivation of the constitutional right to due process or equal pro-
tection. According to the Supreme Court's interpretation in Mo-
nell, "under color of state-law" includes actions taken by police-
men pursuant to a municipal policy or custom 29 derived from
24. The pre-Monell rule was that of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)
(granting municipal governments absolute immunity from section 1983 suits). Monroe was
partially overruled in 1978 by Monell.
25. Monell, 436 U.S. at 700-01; see Nahmod, Government Liability Under Section
1983: The Present is Prologue, 21 URB. LAW. 1, 9-28 (1989) (a review of recent section
1983 cases against municipalities and their impact).
26. See P Low & J. JEFFRIES, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTION 1983 AND RELATED
STATUTES 16 (1988) (statistics show an increase in section 1983 litigation). Despite reme-
dies existing under state law, most plaintiffs who can meet the requirements for a section
1983 suit appear to prefer the federal cause of action to a suit under state law. This is
probably due to the attractions of a federal forum for a suit against a municipality. Under
section 1983, state remedies need not be exhausted before seeking the federal remedy.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183. For a discussion of why plaintiffs prefer a federal forum, see P
Low & J. JEFFRIES, supra at 15 (cataloging common reasons for preference of a federal
forum); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115-30 (1977) (analyz-
ing contemporary preferences for a federal forum and criticizing the idea that state forums
are equally competent to enforce federal rights).
27. Section 1983 suits may also allege a deprivation under federal law. Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). However, a discussion of such suits is beyond the scope of
this note. For further discussion of section 1983 suits alleging a deprivation under federal
law, see Peters, Municipal Liability After Owen v. City of Independence and Maine v.
Thiboutot, in SECTION 1983: SWORD AND SHIELD 429, 461-65 (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle
eds. 1983).
28. Martin v. Delaware Law School of Widener Univ., 625 F Supp. 1288, 1300 (D.
Del. 1985), affd, 884 F.2d 1384 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 411 (1989). Section
1983 reads as follows: "Every person who, under color of any statute, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States to the deprivation of any rights secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
Much has been written about the scope of municipal liability under section 1983. For
an in-depth discussion, see S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION
(2d ed. 1986). This note will focus specifically on the liability of municipalities under sec-
tion 1983 for failure to provide police protection to victims of domestic violence.
29. 436 U.S. at 690-91. In failure-to-protect cases, the policy or custom can either be
a formal police department policy or an informal "pattern or practice" impliedly condoned
1991]
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either municipal lawmakers or municipal employees having final
decision-making power in that area.30 Thus far, many of the ap-
pellate opinions have focused on the question of whether section
1983 domestic violence failure-to-protect claims can withstand
motions for dismissal or summary judgment.31 Recently, several
courts have affirmed that these claims are sufficient to warrant
trial on the merits. 2
This note examines the trend toward holding municipalities
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to provide police protec-
tion to victims of domestic violence. It focuses on plaintiffs' allega-
tions that the municipality has deprived them of equal protection
or of due process. Section II discusses the equal protection claims
brought to date, analyzing the type of evidence needed to bring
these claims successfully and the two-track framework that courts
should use in evaluating the types of discrimination alleged. Sec-
tion III reviews due process theories of recovery It examines one
major theory that has recently been rejected by the Supreme
Court and suggests alternative theories that offer continued viabil-
ity for due process claims.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION THEORY
Suits charging that police department policies have deprived
plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws have been the most con-
sistently successful type of domestic violence failure-to-protect
claims. These equal protection suits rest on the principle that al-
though a municipality has no obligation to provide police protec-
tion to its citizens, once it undertakes to provide such services it
may not provide them in a discriminatory fashion. 33 The initial
suits brought under section 1983 for unequal police protection al-
leged racial discrimination in the allocation of police services.34
by the city through its failure to halt it. See infra text accompanying notes 42-45.
30. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
31. Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988).
32. See, e.g., Balistren v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988) (re-
versing district court's dismissal), amended, 901 F.2d 696, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1990) (district
court erred by refusing plaintiff's request to amend her complaint to state an equal protec-
tion claim); Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988) (reversing
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the city); Thurman v. City of Tor-
rington, 595 F Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (denying motion to dismiss).
33. Watson, 857 F.2d at 690.
34. See, e.g., Green v. Francis, 705 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1983) (sheriff's refusal to
investigate charges that an elderly black couple had been harassed and their home riddled
with gunfire was based on racial discrimination); Hawk v. Perillo, 642 F Supp. 380 (N.D.
[Vol. 41:929
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Thurman v City of Torrington35 was the first case that sought to
extend section 1983 protection to redress discriminatory treatment
of domestic violence victims.
Thurman was a landmark case, establishing 'the requirements
for a domestic violence equal protection claim under section
1983.36 Two years later, Watson v City of Kansas City3 7 clarified
the two types of discrimination claims that may be made in the
domestic violence failure-to-protect context and the level of evi-
dentiary proof needed to withstand summary judgment on each.3s
Watson has provided the clearest statement of the requirements
for equal protection claims to date. Nonetheless, due to the com-
plexity of the legal principles involved, at least one court recently
confused the different types of claims. 39
In order to allege a deprivation of equal protection of the law
as part of a section 1983 suit, a plaintiff must show the following
elements: (1) that a municipal policy existed at the time of her
injury; (2) that the policy created a classification that discrimi-
nated impermissibly against a group of which she was a member;
and (3) that her injury was causally linked to the policy 40
A. Municipal Policy
A well-supported allegation that the discriminatory provision
of police services flowed from a municipal policy, either formal or
informal, is a key element affecting a municipality's liability in a
section 1983 suit. Hence, much attention has focused on the type
of evidence needed to show the existence of such a policy The
most effective evidence of a discriminatory municipal policy is a
Ill. 1985) (police refusal to apprehend assaillants was racially motivated). Racial discrimi-
nation was a type of discrimination clearly barred by the original purpose of section 1983.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961) (purpose of section 1983 was to address
nonenforcement of state laws against racial violence by the Ku Klux Klan), overruled in
part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
35. 595 F Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
36. Id. at 1527-28.
37. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
38. The two types of claims are discrimination against the class of victims of domes-
tic violence, infra text accompanying notes 69-77, and sex discrimination, infra text accom-
panying notes 78-93.
39. See Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988). The Hynson
court's confusion is discussed infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
40. Watson, 857 F.2d at 694; see I. Silver, Police Civil Liability (MB) Form 9:1, at
F-131 (1989) (enumerating the elements of an equal protection complaint alleging failure
to provide police protection against a spouse).
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written policy statement. This may be a provision in a police de-
partment general order or a handbook of police procedure specify-
ing that domestic violence victims are to receive a lesser level of
protection than victims of other types of assault. The lesser level
of protection may be indicated by statements that assign a lower
response priority to domestic calls or prescribe that fewer police
resources (responding officers, investigators, and the like) be allot-
ted to follow up complaints of domestic violence.41 Police training
manuals and curriculum materials may also provide evidence of
an express policy of discrimination. For instance, training materi-
als may state that the preferred police response in domestic vio-
lence situations is mediation while preferring arrest of the offender
in other assault situations.42
In the absence of clearly discriminatory written policies, a
plaintiff may be able to show that the police department had an
informal policy of denying assistance to victims of abuse. To es-
tablish the existence of an informal policy, two types of evidence
have emerged: facts showing a "pattern or practice" of discrimi-
nation 43 and facts suggesting that the municipality condoned or
approved of the discrimination. 4
1. Facts Showing a Pattern or Practice of Discrimination
In Thurman v City of Torrington,45 the court held that the
consistent failure of the police to respond to plaintiff's complaints,
repeated over a lengthy period of time, demonstrated an ongoing
"pattern of deliberate indifference" to persons in the plaintiff's po-
sition and raised an inference that there was a municipal custom
or policy of extending lesser protection to women victims of do-
mestic violence.40 In that case, the police refused to accept a com-
plaint from a woman whose ex-husband repeatedly threatened her
with violence. A few days later, the police stood by while the ex-
41. See J. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE: A GUIDE TO THE EMOTIONAL, PSYCHO-
LOGICAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ABUSED WOMAN AND THOSE HELPING HER
170-74 (1979); UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB:
BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 14, 21 (1982).
42. See, e.g., supra note 17 and accompanying text. The state police training guides
are relevant to demonstrating municipal policies of discrimination because cities are gener-
ally required to conform police training to the state curriculum.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 45-57.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 58-65.
45. 595 F Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
46. Id. at 1530.
[Vol. 41:929
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husband screamed threats at the plaintiff in her car; they refused
to intervene until he broke her windshield. When the plaintiff
later attempted to have her ex-husband arrested for threatening to
shoot her and violating a parole condition that he not threaten her
again, the police told her to return in three weeks. Three weeks
later, she was told to come back after the holiday weekend; and
when she returned at that time, she was informed that the only
policeman who could help her was on vacation.47 The court had no
difficulty finding that these events constituted an informal policy
of denying police services to abused women.48
Referring to one other occasion on which the plaintiff's ex-
husband severely attacked her,49 the court also noted that a "'sin-
gle brutal incident may be sufficient to suggest a link between a
violation of constitutional rights and a pattern of police miscon-
duct.' "50 Normally, however, denials of police protection in the
plaintiff's case alone are not sufficient to show policy or custom,
and a plaintiff must offer additional evidence to establish that the
police engaged in a practice of discrimination.51 For example, po-
lice may regularly refuse to respond to domestic calls or to docu-
ment complaints of domestic violence;52 they may also incorrectly
inform victims that an abuser cannot be arrested unless the police
witness the violence themselves.5"
47. Id. at 1524-25.
48. See id. at 1527 (by refusing to afford plaintiff protection over an eight month
period, the police were in effect operating in a discriminatory fashion).
49. On June 10, 1983, after eight months of harassment and attempted assaults,
Charles Thurman appeared at the residence at which Tracey Thurman was staying and
demanded to speak to her. After Tracey called the police, Charles began to stab her in the
chest, neck, and throat. A police officer arrived about 25 minutes later, and in the officer's
presence, Charles dropped a bloody knife and kicked Tracey in the head. Charles then ran
inside and returned with his son, whom he dropped on top of his wounded ex-wife. Charles
then kicked the plaintiff in the head once more. Three more police officers arrived at the
scene, but no effort was made to take Charles into custody despite his continued threats
toward Tracey. Charles was not arrested until he advanced toward her again while she was
lying on a stretcher. Id. at 1525-26.
50. Id. at 1530 (quoting Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 980 (1979)).
51. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988)
("We doubt whether evidence of [a pattern of] deliberate indifference in the plaintiff's case
alone would be sufficient evidence of different treatment" to support an equal protection
claim. (emphasis in original)); Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F Supp. 574, 578-79
(W.D. Mich. 1986) (dismissing plaintiffs equal protection claim against the township on
the grounds that she failed to allege sufficient facts outside her own case to show the exis-
tence of a municipal policy or custom).
52. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
53. More than half the states now have laws allowing police to arrest an abuser even
1991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Statistical evidence may be utilized to demonstrate that prac-
tice in a city amounts to discriminatory treatment. In Watson v
City of Kansas City,54 the plaintiff, who prevailed on her equal
protection claim, produced statistics showing that the arrest rate
in domestic assault cases in Kansas City was half that for
nondomestic assaults. 55 The statistical evidence in Watson was ef-
fective because it was local (and thus relevant to the plaintiff's
case), and it analyzed police response on the basis of the same
classification that the plaintiff claimed existed (domestic com-
pared with nondomestic assault victims) so that disparities could
easily be seen. The plaintiff in Watson also offered evidence that
police training for domestic violence situations was oriented to-
ward mediation, with arrest as a last resort.56 The court held that
the statistical evidence, coupled with the training curriculum, con-
stituted sufficient evidence of a municipal policy to withstand a
motion for summary judgment and to render the municipality a
proper party 51
if the officers have not witnessed the assault. See Lerman, supra note 10, at 274, 282-83
(survey of state laws that permit warrantless arrest even if the police officer was not a
witness to the abuse).
54. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
55. Id. at 695. The police defendants originally maintained that the statistics show-
ing different arrest rates were not applicable to the case because the statistics did not take
into account the determination of probable cause. The Watson court rejected this argu-
ment, however, stating that the determination of probable cause could also be influenced by
the same discriminatory motives that the plaintiff alleged, and thus probable cause was not
an objective standard. In other words, "the failure to account for probable cause does not
necessarily undermine the probative value of the statistics." Id.
56. Id. at 696.
57. Note, however, that statistical evidence alone may not be sufficient for an equal
protection claim. Id. ("[P]laintiff's statistical evidence alone may not be enough to prove
the existence of a policy or custom." (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987));
c.f. Howell v. City of Catoosa, 729 F Supp. 1308, 1311-12 (N.D. Okla. 1990) (granting
summary judgment on favor of the city on plaintiff's equal protection claim due to an
insufficiency of statistical evidence).
Testimony by other battered women concerning police nonresponse may also be of-
fered as evidence of widespread discriminatory practices. Such testimony may be difficult
to obtain, due to the fact that many battered women feel stigmatized by their abuse and
are reluctant to come forward. In addition, this type of testimony usually provides less
corroboration of the widespread nature of the discriminatory practices than statistical evi-
dence. For these reasons, the testimony of other battered women may be somewhat less
useful than statistical evidence. For an example of a case involving both the testimony of
battered women and statistical evidence, see Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d
976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
[Vol. 41:929
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2. Facts Suggesting Municipal Approval of the Policy or
Custom
Explicit approval of discriminatory police practices by the
municipal government rarely exists in failure-to-protect cases.
However, implicit approval of a policy will also satisfy the "policy
or custom" element. Formal, written police department policies
will satisfy the Monell requirements because they are created or
approved by the police chief, who has final decision-making au-
thority in this area. 8 As for informal policies or customs, the Mo-
nell Court stated that municipalities "may be sued for constitu-
tional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even
though such a custom has not received formal approval through
the body's official decisionmaking channels." 5
Courts have held that a city's silence may be taken as con-
doning the discriminatory practices when those practices are wide-
spread or have occurred over a long period of time. 0 In Thurman
v City of Torrngton,61 the Torrington police ignored the plain-
tiff's reports of threats and assaults over an eight month period,
refused to arrest Charles Thurman even after watching him as-
sault his ex-wife, refused to accept complaints, and refused to con-
duct an investigation. 2 Reviewing these facts, the court held that
tacit approval by the city allowed the individual police defendants
to ignore plaintiff's numerous requests for help with impunity 63
The court did not elaborate; however, it apparently accepted that
many different members of the department repeatedly refused to
58. See Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1986) (municipal liability can
be premised upon actions taken by a municipal employee with final decision-making
authority).
59. 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
60.
A municipality may be found to have adopted a policy through silence as a re-
sult of its failure to sanction its employees for a pattern of conduct of which
municipal policymakers are aware. Stated in another manner, a municipality
cannot "acquiesce" in a pattern of conduct by its employees, and then be heard
to say that those employees were not acting pursuant to municipal policy.
Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F.Supp. 381, 395 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (citing Mariam v.
City of Pittsburgh, 624 F.Supp. 506 (W.D. Pa. 1986)), vacated without opinion, 853 F.2d
917 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Dudosh v. Warg, 488 U.S. 942 (1988), reconsidera-
tion granted in part and denied in part sub nom. Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 722 F
Supp. 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
61. 595 F Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
62. Id. at 1524-26; see supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of
the case in further detail).
63. See id. at 1530 (from a series of acts and omissions by the police department a
pattern of indifference toward the plaintiff emerged).
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help the plaintiff and that this behavior indicated a practice so
widespread that the city must have known about it and condoned
it.6 4 Statistics such as those used by the plaintiff in Watson may
also create an inference that the city knew of and accepted a
widespread pattern of police refusal to provide protective services
to abused women.65
In summary, if there is no explicit policy that mandates less
protection for victims of domestic violence, a plaintiff must show
that the actual practices of the police department, combined with
the city's failure to correct those practices, created a de facto pol-
icy of discrimination. Evidence that discriminatory practices are
widespread or longstanding may be helpful both in showing a pat-
tern of practice and in suggesting municipal approval. Such evi-
dence may also help demonstrate that the municipal policy, rather
than any individual officer's action, was the cause of the plaintiff's
injury
B. Discrimination
There are two types of discrimination that may be alleged as
part of a domestic violence equal protection suit. 6 The first type
alleges that the municipal policy discriminates against victims of
domestic violence. The second type of discrimination claim posits
that police refusals to enforce domestic violence laws are actually
a form of sex discrimination, since most domestic violence victims
are female.67 Although related, the two types of claims have dif-
ferent requirements and invoke different levels of judicial scrutiny
64. See id. ("Such an ongoing pattern of deliberate indifference raises an inference
of 'custom or policy' on the part of the municipality.").
65. The plaintiff offered evidence that the domestic assault arrest rate in Kansas City
was 16% while the nondomestic assault arrest rate was 31 %. Watson v. City of Kansas
City, 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir. 1988). The court in Watson held that "[a] suit against
a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity
are the same" and that claims against the city and the individual police officers are thus
one claim. Id. (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985); Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Under this theory, the actions of
the police officer are viewed as actions of the city and no evidence showing city approval of
police practices is needed. However, it is unlikely that other courts will follow this reason-
ing, which essentially begs the question of municipal approval.
66. The two types of discrimination claims were first analyzed separately in Watson
v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988). See Note, Section 1983 and Do-
mestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem of Police Officers Inaction, 30 B.C.L. RaV.
1357, 1386-87 (1989).
67. See Case Comment, supra note 3, at 671 n.20 (almost 97% of reported domestic
violence victims are female).
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Therefore, courts must exercise great care in analyzing the type of
discrimination alleged in order to avoid confusion between the
two.
6 8
1. Discrimination against Victims of Domestic Violence
This type of discrimination claim alleges that lower levels of
police protection are provided to victims of assault by their inti-
mate partners than to victims of nondomestic assaults. This alle-
gation may be proved by a municipal policy mandating that dif-
ferent treatment be accorded to domestic and nondomestic
crimes.6 The policy may thus discriminate against domestic vio-
lence victims on its face. Alternatively, a discriminatory policy
may be shown through informal patterns of practice. 0 Because
discrimination against victims of domestic violence is relatively
easy to show, this has been the most commonly raised equal pro-
tection claim for domestic violence plaintiffs. Claims based on this
type of discrimination survived motions to dismiss and for sum-
mary judgment in Thurman v City of Torrington,71 Watson v
City of Kansas City,72 Dudosh v City of Allentown,73 and Balis-
treri v Pacifica Police Department.74
Suits involving discrimination against domestic violence vic-
tims receive the lowest level of judicial scrutiny because these vic-
tims have not been found to constitute a suspect classification. 75 A
municipality need only show that the alleged disparate treatment
is a rational means to a legitimate end.76 Nevertheless, municipal-
68. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
69. For instance, a domestic assault may receive a lower response priority than a
street assault, may be assigned fewer responding officers, and often a report is not filed. See
supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 41-65.
71. 595 F Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
72. 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988).,
73. 665 F Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated without opinion, 853 F.2d 917 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Dudosh v. Warg, 488 U.S. 942 (1988), reconsideration
granted in part and denied in part sub nom. Dudosh v. City of Allentown,* 722 F Supp.
1233 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (court will reconsider equal protection claim based inadequate
training).
74. 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988) (women were permitted to replead their defective
complaint because court thought it strongly suggested an equal protection claim).
75. Suspect classifications consist of "discrete and insular minorities." See United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 384 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1937). Strict scrutiny is also
employed when state action infringes upon a fundamental right that derives expressly or
impliedly from the Constitution. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 n.15 (1981).
76. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55, rehg denied, 411
1991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ities have yet to meet this "rational basis" standard, indicating
that courts have not been entirely deferential in examining the
rationality of policies of discrimination against victims of domestic
violence. 7
2. Sex Discrimination
The second possible type of claim is sex discrimination. A
plaintiff may argue that the failure to enforce the laws against
domestic violence harms women disproportionately, since almost
all reported victims of domestic violence are female."' At least on
their face, however, most municipal police department policies are
not discriminatory with respect to women. Therefore, under the
rule developed in Personnel Administrator v Feeney,79 a plaintiff
claiming that a facially neutral policy actually discriminates
against women must show (1) an adverse impact on women, and
(2) that the law or policy was motivated by an animus against
women.8
a
While plaintiffs bringing sex discrimination claims have usu-
ally been able to show that police refusal to enforce domestic vio-
lence laws has had a disproportionately adverse effect on women,"
they have had more difficulty demonstrating that the policy is
based on a discriminatory motive.82 In order to satisfy the Feeney
U.S. 959 (1973).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 111-27.
78. In Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F Supp. 1521 (D. Conn 1984), the court
quoted statistics that 29 of 30 domestic violence victims are women. Id. at 1528 n.1 (cita-
tion omitted); see Comment, supra note 9, at 213 n.l ("95% of all assaults on spouses or
ex-spouses were committed by men") (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 21
(1983)); I. Silver, supra note 40, at 2-23 n.6 (1990) (an estimated 97% of spouse abuse
victims are female)).
79. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
80. Id. at 274. "'Discriminatory purpose,' implies that the decisionmaker
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 279 (footnote omitted);
see Case Comnment, supra note 3, at 685-87 (describing the two-part Feeney test).
81. See supra note 78; see also McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 423 (5th
Cir. 1989) (Goldberg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[N]umerous scholarly
studies have recognized that women are primarily the victims of domestic abuse.").
82. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696-97 (10th Cir. 1988)
(sex discrimination claim denied because of lack of evidence of either adverse impact or
discriminatory intent); Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir. 1988)
(police categorization of crimes as either domestic violence or nondomestic violence is in-
sufficient to show intent to discriminate necessary for a successful challenge under the Fee-
ney standard). Most gender discrimination claims have been dismissed for failure to satisfy
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standard for discriminatory intent, the plaintiff must show that
the policy in question rests on impermissible stereotypes regarding
women and is. not motivated by a gender-neutral purpose.8 3 In
Feeney, the Supreme Court held that the standard had not been
met, as the pro-veteran job preference at issue had a valid, gen-
der-neutral purpose. 4 Justice Stevens also noted that the prefer-
ence disadvantaged almost as many men as it did women.85
The Feeney intent standard may be met in cases where police
refusal to intervene rests on stereotypic notions regarding a man's
prerogative to "discipline" his wife or reflecting the belief that "a
man's home is his castle."88 Such policies reinforce the belief that
women must be submissive to men in the home and send the mes-
sage that women who do not please their spouse "deserve" to be
abused. In Mississippi University for Women v Hogan,87 the Su-
preme Court held that discriminatory practices based on "tradi-
tional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of
men and women" would be found invalid.88 Municipal policies of
police nonintervention in domestic assault often rest on such
"traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions."89
this second prong of the Feeney test.
83. For an excellent discussion of domestic violence sex discrimination claims, see
Eppler, supra note 13, at 796-805; Case Comment, supra note 3, at 683-87.
84. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 277-78. The Massachusetts law challenged in Feeney, which
created a preference for hiring military veterans, was found to "confer[] upon a par-
ticularly deserving [group] a competitive headstart." Id. at 277.
85. Id. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring).
86. The husband's right to discipline his wife has a long history at common law,
related to the concept of wives as chattel. For a review of the changing scope of the disci-
plinary prerogative at common law, see UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 41, at 1-3; Eppler, supra note 13, at 791-93; Note, supra note 16, at 705.
87. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
88. Id. at 726. The Court declared:
Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective [here, the
policy decision not to intervene in domestic assaults] itself reflects archaic and
stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude members of
one gender because they are presumed to be innately inferior, the objective
itself is illegitimate.
Id. at 725.
89. "'Police response to social conflict, particularly domestic social conflict, is inter-
twined with traditional conceptions of male-female roles. There appears wider accept-
ance of the idea that a little corporal punishment to the recalcitrant wife is not all that
deviant.'" J. FLEMING, supra note 41, at 171-72, 152 (quoting Detroit Executive Deputy
Chief of Police James Bannon), quoted in Eppler, supra note 13, at 798 n.46.
Police officers have stated that they might "make an arrest depending upon the reason
the man hit her." Blodgett, Violence in the Home, 73 A.B.A. J., May 1987, at 66, 68,
quoted in Comment, supra note 8, at 217. While the abuser's justification for the assault,
may have relevance as a defense at trial, it should not affect a police officer's determination
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Evidence of an intent to discriminate against women may
sometimes be obtained from the police themselves, through verbal
statements made to the plaintiff at the scene of the assault or in
deposition. In the few cases in which a domestic violence sex dis-
crimination claim has been allowed to proceed to trial, the courts
have relied on statements made by police officers that indicated
their refusal to intervene was motivated by either an animus to-
ward abused women,90 or a view that domestic violence is a rela-
tively nonserious crime affecting primarily women. 9'
Thus, a domestic violence victim may be able to bring a suc-
cessful sex discrimination claim by showing that a facially neutral
police policy has a discriminatory effect (disproportionate harm to
women) and was motivated at least in part by gender-based biases
(stereotypic notions about women).92 If the plaintiff is successful
of whether there has been an assault in the first place.
90. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir. 1988) (respond-
ing officer stated that he "'did not blame plaintiff's husband for hitting her, because of the
way she was "carrying on.""). But in McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.
1989), the court held the statement made by the police chief that "officers did not like to
make arrests in domestic assault cases since the women involved either wouldn't file
charges or would drop them," id. at 411, was not probative evidence of a discriminatory
intent. Id. at 415.
91. Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F Supp. 381, 392-94 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (officers'
statements in depositions evidenced a belief that domestic violence is a less serious crime
than assault by a stranger); see Comment, Does the Legal System Batter Women? Vindi-
cating Battered Women s Constitutional Rights to Adequate Police Protection, 21 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 705, 722-26 (1989). When the perpetrator and the victim are intimate partners,
"the legal system transforms the behavior into domestic violence, an implicitly less heinous
offense." Id. at 726.
92. Some plaintiffs have attempted to use the "discriminatory enforcement" argu-
ment first recognized in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), alleging that the dis-
criminatory enforcement of assault laws is an intentionally maintained disadvantage to
women. See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn.
1984) (police practice of providing inadequate or no protection to women abused by close
relations caused the law to be implemented in a discriminatory manner). Under Yick Wo,
the intent to discriminate may be inferred if a law is enforced so unevenly that one class of
persons is singled out to bear the entire burden of the law. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74. If
a municipality chooses to enforce its assault laws so that arrests are made in other types of
cases, but never in domestic violence cases, a domestic violence victim injured by the dis-
criminatory application of the laws could bring a Yick Wo-type claim.
In Yick Wo, 100% of Chinese laundry owners were denied permits, as compared to
only I % of nonChinese laundry owners. The court in Watson did not directly address the
issue but apparently considered the disproportionality between arrest rates of 31 % for
nondomestic assaults versus 16% for domestic assaults insufficient to infer an intent to
discriminate against women. Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695-97 (10th
Cir. 1988) (while plaintiff's statistical evidence may not have been sufficient standing
alone, the facts, as a whole, were sufficient to support a jury finding that city police af-
forded less protection to domestic violence victims than to victims of other crimes). As
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in establishing a viable sex discrimination claim, the level of judi-
cial scrutiny is heightened, and the state must articulate an im-
portant government interest to justify the discriminatory policy 93
As it is unlikely that a municipality could meet this higher level of
scrutiny, a well-pleaded sex discrimination claim would virtually
guarantee success for the plaintiff. However, not all plaintiffs may
be able to establish the discriminatory intent necessary for a gen-
der discrimination claim.
3. The Necessity of Distinguishing between the Two Types of
Discrimination Claims
While discrimination against domestic violence victims may
also be used as a starting point for a sex discrimination claim, the
two types of claims are different and should be analyzed sepa-
rately by courts. One key distinction between the two is that sex
discrimination claims impose a higher burden of proof on the
plaintiff due to the necessity of showing discriminatory intent in
the absence of a facially discriminatory policy In the event that a
plaintiff chooses not to bring a sex discrimination claim (or brings
both types of claims but is denied on the sex discrimination
claim), courts must recognize that the claim of discrimination
against domestic violence victims stands on its own.94 Courts have
Watson demonstrates, uncertainty exists as to how much disproportionality will be required
to create an inference of discriminatory motive. Perhaps as a result of this unresolved dis-
proportionality issue, no domestic violence victim has yet prevailed on a gender discrimina-
tion claim using a Yick Wo argument alone.
In Watson, the court referred to Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), to
support its assertion that plaintiffs seeking to show discriminatory intent through adverse
impact bear a heavy burden. Watson, 857 F.2d at 696-97. The Supreme Court in Feeney
upheld a veterans' job preference statute even though fewer than 2% of women would be
eligible for the benefit, thereby disadvantaging the remaining 98 %. 442 U.S. at 270, 280-
81. However, the Supreme Court may simply have been unwilling to find discriminatory
intent in what was clearly an attempt to help veterans. Both the plainly legitimate purpose
of the statute, and the fact that the statute discriminated against almost as many non-
veteran men as women, id. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring), militate against taking the
98% disproportionality of Feeney as a true threshold for discriminatory intent.
93. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (For a gender classification to be up-
held, it "must serve important government objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."), reh g dinied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977). Courts have ap-
plied an intermediate level of scrutiny in Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F Supp.
1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984), and Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F Supp. 381, 392
(1987). See I. Silver, supra note 40, § 2.07, at 2-23 n.6 ("Since gender is a 'quasi-suspect'
classification, and since 97% of all spouse abuse victims are estimated to be female,
an intermediate level of scrutiny of the classification is proper.").
94. The court in Watson took exactly this two-track approach, holding that the
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sometimes confused the two types of claims, the requirements of
each, and the appropriate level of scrutiny that should be ap-
plied.95 This confusion has muddled the two theories and has im-
paired the ability of courts to apply precedent.
In Thurman v City of Torrington, the plaintiff alleged that
the police provided consistently less protection for women as-
saulted by husbands or boyfriends than for those attacked by
strangers.98 Although the sex discrimination claim was not stated
separately from the claim of discrimination against victims of do-
mestic violence, the specification that women victims of domestic
abuse were being discriminated against implicitly raised both
types of discrimination claims. As the complaint alleged both, the
court held that the higher level of scrutiny required to justify sex
discrimination should be applied. 7 While the court's willingness
to recognize the implied sex discrimination claim is salutary, the
court should have considered the separate requirements of each
type of claim before denying dismissal on both implied claims.
In Hynson v City of Chester,98 the court confused the two
types of discrimination, applying the test for sex discrimination to
a claim of discrimination against domestic violence victims. Al-
though the complaint alleged that "police officers treat domestic
abuse cases differently than non-domestic cases" 9 (a clear claim
of discrimination against domestic violence victims), the court in-
terpreted the allegation as raising only a sex discrimination
claim. 00
The court's error apparently derived from a misreading of
Watson, where the court denied the plaintiff's sex discrimination
claim while allowing her claim of discrimination against domestic
plaintiff's claim of discrimination against domestic violence victims was valid, while deny-
ing her gender discrimination claim. Watson, 857 F.2d at 696-97.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
96. Thurman, 595 F Supp. at 1526-27. The plaintiff also alleged that the city and
its police had a similar policy of affording little or no protection to children abused by their
fathers or stepfathers. However, this claim was dismissed for lack of evidence. Id. at 1527.
97. Sex-based classifications require a substantial relation to an important govern-
mental interest. Id. at 1527 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). The court
noted the possibility that at trial the classification might turn out not to be based on gen-
der, in which case a lower level of scr.utiny would apply. For the purpose of reviewing the
motion to dismiss, however, the court took the plaintiff's allegations of sex-based discrimi-
nation as true. Id. at 1528 n.l.
98. 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988).




violence victims to proceed to trial.10 Although the Hynson court
correctly concluded that proof of discrimination against domestic
violence victims is not by itself enough to show intent to discrimi-
nate against women, it wrongly concluded that the two types of
claims were in fact the same. The Hynson court defined the re-
quirements for an equal protection claim as (1) a municipal policy
or custom of providing less protection to victims of domestic vio-
lence than to other victims of violence, (2) proof that discrimina-
tion against women was a motivating factor behind the adoption
of the policy, and (3) proof that the plaintiff was injured by the
policy or custom.' 0 The court then found that the plaintiff had
not carried her burden of showing an intent to discriminate
against women and foreclosed her equal protection claims en-
tirely 103 The court's mistake lay in the second part of the test: the
plaintiff should have had to show that the policy intentionally dis-
criminated against victims of domestic violence, rather than
women, since it was the discriminatory classification of domestic
versus nondomestic assault victims that was alleged, not gender
discrimination.
By incorrectly requiring the plaintiff to make the more diffi-
cult showing of a gender discrimination claim and dismissing her
claim of discrimination against domestic violence victims, the
Hynson court wrongly dismissed the plaintiff's equal protection
claim and confused the standards for the two types of discrimina-
tion that may be alleged." 4 Thus, although Hynson is the more
recent case, Watson remains the clearest exposition of the two
types of discrimination claims and of their requirements. Courts
should look to Watson rather than Hynson for guidance in domes-
tic violence equal protection cases.
101. Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988). The plain-
tiff in Watson separately alleged each type of discrimination in her complaint.
102. Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031 (emphasis added).
103. Id. Additionally, the court held that the defendant officers would possess a qual-
ified immunity on the equal protection claim if a reasonable police officer would not have
known that a policy of treating domestic violence cases as nonserious offenses would violate
the equal protection rights of women victims. Id. at 10:2.
104. Further evidence of the Hynson court's fundamental misunderstanding of the
legal theories behind this line of cases is evidenced by the court's erroneous statement that
Thurman dealt with a section 1983 due process claim. Id. at 1031 n.14. In truth, Thurman
was solely an equal protection claim. See 595 F Supp. 1521, 1526-31 (D. Conn. 1984).
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C. Causation
Although courts often cite causation-a causal link between
the municipal policy or custom and the plaintiff's injury-as a
separate element in section 1983 equal protection claims, in prac-
tice it is rarely addressed separately Instead, once the existence of
a municipal policy or custom has been shown, courts have as-
sumed that the injurious actions of the individual police officers
were taken pursuant to that policy, not merely on their own. In
Thurman the court upheld the plaintiff's allegation that the police
officers' inaction resulted from the city's policy; it stated that "a
complaint of this sort will survive dismissal if it alleges a policy or
custom of condoning police misconduct that violates constitutional
rights and alleges 'that the City's pattern of inaction caused the
plaintiffs any compensable injury' "105 Conversely, the failure to
prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom may mean
that the causation element cannot be shown either In Bartalone
v County of Berrien,"0 6 an otherwise valid equal protection claim
was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to allege any facts dem-
onstrating that her injury was traceable to a municipal policy or
custom rather than the isolated actions of a police officer. 107 Evi-
dence showing a discriminatory pattern of practice is thus neces-
sary to establish both the elements of policy or custom and
causation.
D Municipal Defenses To Equal Protection Claims
Municipalities may avoid liability under section 1983 equal
protection claims if they can show either that the plaintiff's al-
leged harm was not caused by a discriminatory municipal pol-
105. Thurman, 595 F.Supp. at 1530 (quoting Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393,
397-98 (2d Cir. 1983)). The complaint alleged that the
City of Torrington acting through its Police Department, condoned a pattern or
practice of affording inadequate protection, or no protection at all, to women
who have complained of having been abused Said pattern, custom or pol-
icy, well known to the individual defendants, was the basis on which they ig-
nored said numerous complaints and reports of threats to the plaintiffs with
impunity.
Id. at 1529.
106. 643 F.Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
107. Id. at 578-79. Plaintiff must allege that "the wrong she suffered was due to
municipal policy and not simply the isolated action of a single nonpolicymaking
wrongdoer." Id. at 579 (citations omitted).
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icy, 108 meaning that the required elements for section 1983 suits
are not present, or that the policy advances a state interest suffi-
cient to justify the alleged discrimination. 10 9
With regard to the elements of a section 1983 suit, a munici-
pality may be able to avoid liability by showing that its police
policies are nondiscriminatory and provide effective protection to
victims of domestic violence. To succeed on such a theory, the city
may be required to show that its nondiscriminatory policy was in
fact carried out, through police training in appropriate techniques
and actual nondiscriminatory law enforcement. Several cities have
already adopted measures to ensure equal protection for domestic
violence victims and have found that these efforts reduce the po-
lice department's workload as well as the city's risk of liability 110
Alternatively, the municipality could demonstrate to the
court that discrimination in police protection is justified. Since do-
mestic violence victims are not a suspect classification, all that is
required is that the discriminatory policy or custom bear a ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate state end.111 In most contexts,
the low level of judicial scrutiny under the "rational basis" test
translates into approval of whatever justification is offered.112
However, in the context of domestic violence failure-to-protect
108. Id. at 578-79.
109. A municipality cannot avoid section 1983 equal protection liability under quali-
fied immunity. The Supreme Court, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982),
held that individual defendant officers were protected by qualified immunity where the
plaintiff's particular constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the al-
leged violation. However, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980), held
that a city may not claim immunity through the immunity of its individual officers, so the
issue of qualified immunity for individual defendants is irrelevant to the question of munic-
ipal liability. Similarly, the court in Watson v. City of Kansas City concluded that "there
is nothing anomalous about allowing such a suit [against the city] to proceed when immu-
nity shields the individual defendants." 857 F.2d 690, 697 (10th Cir. 1988).
110. Among these cities are Duluth, Minnesota; Concord, New Hampshire; Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania; Charleston, South Carolina; and Newport News, Virginia. See Com-
ment, supra note 8, at 215 (detailing the success of these cities); see also Lang, supra note
8, at 55 (describing the experiences of particular cities with stricter enforcement of domes-
tic violence laws).
11. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44-53 (1973)
(articulating the rational basis standard). If the claim were one of discrimination against
women, any justification offered would have to meet a higher level of scrutiny. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see supra note 97 and accompanying text. As cities have
not yet presented a justification that satisfies the lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis, it is
difficult to imagine a justification that could withstand the intermediate level of scrutiny.
112. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 558 (11 th ed. 1985) (describing the
deferential rational basis standard as "minimum scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact").
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cases, courts have been willing to scrutinize the relationship be-
tween means and ends more closely and have suggested that not
all justifications will be accepted.
In Thurman v City of Torrington, the city failed to articu-
late any reason for its policy in its pleadings, leaving the plaintiff's
equal protection claim unchallenged. 113 Nevertheless, the court
took the opportunity to reject possible justifications for discrimina-
tion against victims of domestic abuse. First, the court stated that
"[t] oday any notion of a husband's prerogative to physically
discipline his wife is an 'increasingly outdated misconception.' 11,,4
The court then rejected the "notion'that [refusing to intervene in
domestic violence cases] can be justified as a means of promoting
domestic harmony" since the plaintiff's marital harmony has al-
ready been shattered by violence." 5 The fact that a victim seeks
police intervention clearly indicates her belief that there is a prob-
lem that she cannot handle on her own."16
A court that suspects irrational negative stereotypes about a
group underlie the adoption of a discriminatory policy may be jus-
tified in applying a rational basis standard that is nondeferential.
In this situation, courts look carefully at the means and ends of
the policy, even when no suspect class is involved and the level of
scrutiny is theoretically minimal. In City of Cleburne v Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.,' 7 the Supreme Court applied a nondeferential
rational basis standard to strike down a burdensome city zoning
permit procedure for group homes for the mentally retarded, be-
cause they found that irrational fears about mentally retarded
persons provided a partial motivation for the city's policy The
Court held that group homes for mentally retarded persons were
no different from hospitals, fraternity houses, and nursing homes
(for which no special permit was required). The Court stated that
"mere negative attitudes unsubstantiated by factors which
are properly cognizable are not permissible bases for treating
a home for the mentally retarded differently 'Private biases
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly
or indirectly, give them effect.' "11
113. 595 F Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Conn. 1984).
114. Id. at 1528 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 198-99).
115. Id. at 1529.
116. Id.
117. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
118. Id. at 448 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
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Domestic violence victims are not situated differently from
other citizens in their need for protection from violence. Applying
the Cleburne rule, a court could easily find that "mere negative
attitudes" about victims of abuse lie behind the police refusal to
intervene in domestic assaults. If the court finds that such nega-
tive attitudes are implicit in the city's policies, it would be appro-
priate to apply the nondeferential rational basis standard used in
Cleburne. Under this test a court would examine more carefully
the city's purpose and the rationality of the means used to achieve
it.
The nondeferential rational basis test provides a needed
check on justifications that cities may offer for discriminating
against domestic violence victims. For instance, one defense that a
city might offer is that it is entitled to allocate scarce resources as
it sees fit, and that such allocation includes the ability to assign
differing levels of police response to various crimes." 9 Under a
deferential rational basis standard, this justification would likely
be accepted by a court. Under the nondeferential rational basis
standard established in Cleburne, however, limiting the police pro-
tection available to domestic violence victims on efficiency grounds
would likely be found irrational for two reasons. First, providing
less assistance to victims of domestic violence is an unreasonable
method of allocating the burden of crime across citizens. Because
domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in the
United States, 120 enforcement of domestic violence laws against
batterers may be the single most effective method of reducing in-
jury to local citizens. Police refusal to enforce these laws would
leave an especially vulnerable class of citizens unprotected against
crime, while offering more protection to citizens who may need it
less. Second, as arresting batterers has been shown to reduce re-
peat domestic calls,' encouraging the police to take prompt ac-
tion on domestic violence complaints may actually save money
over a policy of nonintervention. "' "This is particularly evident in
119. See Eppler, supra note 13, at 795 (suggesting that police may try to offer an
efficiency justification based on the fact that battered women often drop charges brought
against their assailants).
120. See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 4.
121. See Sherman & Berk, supra note 12, at 267 (under three different statistical
methods it was shown that arrest, not separation or mediation, resulted in the lowest num-
ber of repeat assaults).
122. See Comment, supra note 8, at 216 (citing great decreases in the rate of domes-
tic violence-related homicides in Newport News, Virginia, and assaults in Duluth, Minne-
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light of evidence indicating that, of the standard modes of police
intervention in cases of [domestic] abuse, arrest is the most effec-
tive means of reducing domestic violence." 123 For these reasons,
the "allocation of scarce resources" would not be a rational justifi-
cation for nonenforcement of domestic violence laws under a
nondeferential standard of review 124
In the equal protection cases brought to date, municipalities
have not offered any justification for their discriminatory poli-
cies,125 apparently preferring to defend on the ground that the city
had no policy of discrimination in the first place. By making this
choice, municipalities avoid having to meet the nondeferential ra-
tional basis standard of Cleburne. However, even under the most
deferential rational basis standard, courts so far have allowed
every properly established equal protection claim brought by do-
mestic violence victims to proceed to trial.12 6 Therefore, equal pro-
tection continues to be the most effective theory of recovery for
plaintiffs injured by police unwillingness to assist domestic vio-
lence victims. 127
III. DUE PROCESS THEORY
Although equal protection claims continue to be asserted in
sota, after adoption of mandatory arrest policies in those cities).
123. Case Comment, supra note 3, at 690 (citing Sherman & Berk, supra note 12,
at 267).
124. For a review and rebuttal of other possible municipal justifications, see Case
Comment, supra note 3, at 687-90.
125. See, e.g., Thurman, 595 F Supp. at 1528 ("In its memorandum and at oral
argument, the city has failed to put forward any justification for its disparate treatment of
women.").
126. See supra notes 33-40. For cases in which equal protection claims were not
properly established, see McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 727 (1990); Howell v. City of Catoosa, 729 F Supp. 1308 (N.D. Okla.
1990); Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
127. In McKee, the Fifth Circuit expressed the view that the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3
(1989), requires courts to view equal protection claims cautiously to ensure that "plaintiffs
do not "circumvent the rule in DeShaney by converting every Due Process claim into an
Equal Protection Claim." McKee, 877 F.2d at 413, (cited with approval in Howell, 729 F
Supp. at 1312. If other courts follow McKee's cautious view, equal protection claims may
be more difficult to prove. However, the court's statement in McKee is completely without
support in DeShaney and is almost certainly wrong. The footnote referred to by the McKee
court states that "the State may not, of course, selectively deny its protective services to
certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause." DeShaney,
489 U.S. at 197 n.3 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). This language does
not support the cautious tone suggested by the McKee court.
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section 1983 failure-to-protect cases, due process claims have pro-
vided an additional theory of recovery Due process claims allow
an avenue of recovery for the plaintiff who can show that she was
injured by action taken pursuant to a municipal policy or custom,
but who may not be able to prove the discriminatory effect or in-
tent needed for an equal protection claim.
The central tension in due process failure-to-protect cases
concerns the issue of whether a state can be liable under the four-
teenth amendment for failing to act. Traditionally, the state must
take some affirmative action that deprives an individual of life,
liberty, or property in order to trigger the protection of the due
process clause. In failure-to-protect cases, however, the depriva-
tion is caused by state inaction. The challenge for plaintiffs seek-
ing to bring due process claims lies in showing that the state's
failure to act violated the fourteenth amendment. Two approaches
have been developed to resolve this action/inaction dilemma.
The first approach is the special relationship theory This the-
ory posits that in certain circumstances the state has an obligation
to act, and by failing to act the state violates the constitutional
rights of the person toward whom it owes the obligation. 12 How-
ever, this approach was recently rejected by the Supreme Court in
DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices.129 The second approach holds that the creation of an arbi-
trary governmental policy of inaction toward certain citizens itself
constitutes state action.130
A. Special Relationship Theory
The primary method of tying a state's inaction to a due pro-
cess violation has been the special relationship theory Normally,
the state does not owe a duty of protection to any specific person,
since the duty to protect is a general one owed to the public at
large.13 1 In failure-to-protect cases, plaintiffs have attempted to
show that a "special relationship" existed between themselves and
the state at the time of their injury, distinguishing them from the
general public and rendering the state's failure to protect them
actionable.
This theory has always been somewhat tenuous, drawing its
128. See infra text accompanying notes 131-54.
129. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
130. See infra text accompanying notes 162-89.
131. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1980).
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strength mainly from tort principles imported into constitutional
law to provide a familiar system for deciding liability issues in
section 1983 cases. As a result of the Supreme Court's 1989 deci-
sion in DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social
Services,3 2 the special relationship theory has lost much of its ap-
plicability in the failure-to-protect context. The origins of special
relationship theory in failure-to-protect cases are traced below,
and the impact of DeShaney is analyzed.
1. Development of the Theory
In dictum, the Thurman v City of Torrington court uttered a
statement that has been used repeatedly in domestic violence fail-
ure-to-protect cases:
City officials and police officers are under an affirmative
duty to preserve law and order, and to protect the personal
safety of persons in the community If officials have
notice of the possibility of attacks on women in domestic
relationships or other persons, they are under an affirma-
tive duty to take reasonable measures to protect the per-
sonal safety of such persons in the community 133
This declaration served as an underpinning for section 1983
claims brought under the due process clause alleging an "affirma-
tive duty" on the part of police to provide protection to persons
known to be in danger of domestic assault. Nevertheless, the con-
cept of an affirmative duty to protect is of dubious validity As the
cases discussed below indicate,"" defining the circumstances
under which a duty to protect is triggered has been problematic
and continues to be a source of conflict.
The phrase "special relationship" grew out of the "special
custodial or other relationships created or assumed by the state"
identified by the Fourth Circuit in Fox v Custis.3 5 The concept
of special relationship was first applied to prisoners in Estelle v
Gamble."6 The Supreme Court held that since an inmate in the
custody of the state is dependent on the state for certain needs,
failure to meet those needs may be a violation of the eighth
132. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
133. 595 F Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
134. See infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
135. 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983) (reciting instances in which state liability in
failure-to-protect cases might arise).
136. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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amendment for which the state is liable under section 1983.37
This duty to protect individuals in custody was later held applica-
ble under the fourteenth amendment as well. According to the
Court, "the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's
freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institu-
tionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty-
trigger[s] the protections of the Due Process Clause "a138
The scope of the custodial relationship under the fourteenth
amendment has been expanded to include nonprisoners for whom
the state has assumed legal responsibility, such as state psychiat-
ric hospital inmates 39 and foster children.' 40
Efforts to extend the special relationship concept beyond the
custodial context have been problematic. Courts have turned to
tort principles such as foreseeability of harm and causation to set
coherent limits on state liability 141 For example, in Martinez v
California,L42 the Supreme Court held that the state was not lia-
ble for a parolee's murder of a fifteen year old girl because the
killing was "too remote" a consequence of the state's decision to
release the parolee. 43 These tort concepts have been integrated
137. Id. at 101-05. In Estelle, the plaintiff alleged that the State's failure to provide
adequate medical attention for his back injury was cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at
99-101.
138. DeSh~ney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989).
139. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (state had constitutional
duty to provide safety, medical attention, and some type of training to mentally retarded
patient). But cf. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (state had no duty to
protect member of the public from released schizophrenic who killed her).
140. See Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981)
(nonperformance of custodial duties to a foster child may violate section 1983).
141. For a discussion of the use of tort principles in section 1983 due process claims,
see Note, Defining the Scope of the Due Process Right to Protection: The Fourth Circuit
Considers Child Abuse and Good Faith Immunity, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 940 (1985) (dis-
cussing causation); Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure to
Act, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 1048 (1986) (same).
142. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
143. Id. at 285. Courts have continued to deny state liability when the danger was to
the public as a whole rather than to a known individual. See, e.g., Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d
84 (4th Cir. 1983) (section 1983 claim dismissed because released arsonist did not have
special relationship to plaintiff whose house was burned down); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d
616 (7th Cir. 1982) (no constitutional right to be protected from murderers).
Courts have been more willing to entertain claims when the state knew that former
criminal or psychiatric inmates posed a danger to identifiable individuals and failed to act
to protect those individuals. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421
(9th Cir. 1988) (repeated notice to police of husband's danger toward wife created special
relationship and duty to protect); Sherrell ex. rel. Wooden v. City of Longview, 683 F
Supp. 1108 (E.D. Tex. 1987) (repeated reports to police of child abuse by a certain mdi-
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into the factors used to determine whether a special relationship
exists. In Jensen v Conrad,14' the Fourth Circuit reviewed the
special relationship line of cases and summarized the factors to be
considered as: (1) whether the criminal or victim was in state cus-
tody during or shortly before the incident; (2) whether the state
committed itself to protecting a particular class or specific individ-
uals; and (3) whether the state knew of the danger to the
victim. 148
2. Special Relationship Theory in the Context of Domestic
Violence Cases
Victims of domestic violence have premised their failure-to-
protect claims on similar tort-based special relationship theories.
In Dudosh v City of Allentown,"4" the court found that a special
relationship existed between the plaintiff and the city police de-
partment based on the police department's knowledge of repeated
attacks on the victim and the fact that the department had been
served with a protection order that "placed an affirmative duty
upon the police to protect" the victim.' 4 7 The court's finding was
vidual was sufficient to create a special relationship). This type of state liability is similar
to the liability imposed on psychiatrists who are aware of the danger their patients pose to
specific people. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551
P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
144. 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
145. Id. at 194 n.l 1. These three factors are equivalent to the tort concepts of state
assumption of duty and foreseeability of harm.
146. 629 F Supp. 849 (E.D. Pa. 1985) [hereinafter Dudosh 1], summary judgment
granted in part and denied in part, 665 F Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1987) [hereinafter Dudosh
IIl, vacated without opinion 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Dudosh v.
Warg, 488 U.S. 942 (1988), reconsideration gr'anted in part and denied in part sub nom.
Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 722 F Supp. 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (reconsideration granted
with respect to equal protection claim on inadequate training and denied with respect to
due process claim).
147. Dudosh I, 629 F Supp. at 855. In Dudosh 1 the court granted summary judg-
ment on the due process claim, in part because the facts were insufficient to prove special
relationship. Dudosh I1, 665 F Supp. at 390. An individual may have a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in bodily security. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74
(1977) (discussing whether corporal punishment in schools violates the due process clause).
Deprivation of this liberty interest without due process violates the fourteenth amendment.
See id.
The Dudosh I court was following the lead of the Third Circuit in Estate of Bailey ex.
rel. Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985) (vacating the dismissal of a case
brought by an abused child's estate), which in turn relied heavily on Jensen. The Dudosh I
court also noted that the court in Bailey cited approvingly the language in Thurman that
"'[c]ity officials and police officers are under an affirmative duty to preserve law and order,
and to protect the personal safety of persons in the community.'" Dudosh 1, 629 F Supp.
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interpreted as having been based solely on the Jensen "state
knowledge" factor; therefore, it substantially reduced the level of
evidence needed to establish a special relationship. Two subse-
quent domestic violence cases, Lowers v City of Streator148 and
Sherrell ex rel. Wooden v City of Longview,1 49 held that a special
relationship could be created solely by the city's awareness of the
victim's plight.
By 1988 courts had begun to back away from this bold posi-
tion. In Balistreri v Pacifica Police Department,150 the Ninth Cir-
cuit noted that although state awareness may be considered in the
special relationship determination, "[t]he district court [was]
probably correct in its suggestion that the state's awareness of the
victim's plight, by itself, will not create a 'special relation-
ship.' "151 The Ninth Circuit identified four factors to be weighed
in determining the existence of a special relationship:
(1) whether the state created or assumed a custodial rela-
tionship toward the plaintiff; (2) whether the state was
aware of a specific risk of harm to the plaintiff; (3)
whether the state affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a po-
sition of danger; or (4) whether the state affirmatively
committed itself to the protection of the plaintiff.152
The court concluded that, while awareness of risk was insufficient
standing alone, state awareness plus a state commitment to pro-
tect the victim1 53 was enough to validate the plaintiff's claim of a
special relationship.I5
4
at 855 n.6 (quoting Thurman v. City of-Torrngton, 595 F Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn.
1984) (citation omitted)).
148. 627 F Supp. 244, 246 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (defendant's knowledge that plaintiff
faced a certain danger from a known individual found to have created a special
realtionship).
149. 683 F Supp. 1108, 1113 (E.D. Tex. 1987) (defendant's awareness of repeated
threats to the child by a specified individual created a special relationship).
150. 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988), superseded, 897 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), withdrawn
and superseded, 901 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1990) (following DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)).
151. Balistrert, 855 F.2d at 1426 (district court cited Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d
185, 195 n.li (4th Cir. 1984)).
152. Balistrert, 855 F.2d at 1425.
153. The court found allegations that the state had made a commitment to provide
the plaintiff with protective services when it issued her a protection order sufficient to sat-
isfy the fourth factor of its special relationship test. Id. at 1426.
154. Id. While Dudosh I is read as establishing the proposition that only state
awareness is required for a special relationship claim, see supra notes 144-45 and accompa-
nying text, in fact, the Dudosh I court based its holding on awareness plus the existence of
a valid protection order. Dudosh I, 629 F.Supp. at 854-55, cited in Balistreri, 855 F.2d at
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3. The Effect of DeShaney on Special Relationship Theory
In DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social
Services,155 the Supreme Court ruled that the state owed no duty
of protection to an abused child, although the Department of So-
cial Services had documented the child's injuries and the state had
committed itself to protecting abused children by passing child
protection legislation."5" Casting doubt on the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Balistreri, the DeShaney Court held that state aware-
ness of danger to a specific person, coupled with an express state
commitment to protect a class including that person, was insuffi-
cient to create a special relationship between the state and the
individual. 157 As there was no special relationship, the state had
no affirmative duty to protect the child and thus its subsequent
failure to provide adequate protection could not result in section
1983 liability 158
Instead, the Court limited the duty to protect to the custodial
context discussed above. 159 "The affirmative duty to protect arises
not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or
from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation
which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf."'1 0
Regarding the due process clause as intended to protect citizens
from oppression by the state, the Court declared that "a State's
failure to protect an individual against private violence simply
1426. Thus, Balistreri seems to have come full circle to the actual holding of Dudosh
without gaining any new ground. The court in Dudosh II, in granting summary judgment
on the due process claim, apparently ignored the existence of the protective order and
found that awareness alone was insufficient for finding a special relationship. Dudosh II,
665 F Supp. at 390.
155. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
156. Id. at 192-93, 195 n.2.
157. Id. at 197-98.
158. Id. at 198-201. The Court suggested that the state's failure to protect Joshua
might give rise to a cause of action under state tort law, although it would not do so under
section 1983 for due process violations. Id. at 201-02.
In Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1055-58 (2d Cir. 1990), the court
upheld a special relationship theory essentially identical to that discussed here in a state
negligence claim.
159. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200; see supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text
(duty to protect in the custodial context).
160. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. This language raised an outcry from some observ-
ers, since Joshua DeShaney was a three year old child who was certainly unable to "act on
his own behalf" to protect himself from abuse by his father. Indeed, the state was the only
actor conscious of Joshua's plight that was capable of legally removing him from his fa-
ther's home, since his mother lived out of state and was unaware of the abuse.
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does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." 161
Clearly, the practical effect of DeShaney on failure-to-protect
cases is to eliminate due process claims based upon the special
relationship theory Although DeShaney did not expressly overrule
the special relationship holdings of Dudosh, Lowers, Sherrell, and
Balistren, its rejection of the special relationship theory outside of
the custodial context effectively removed the foundation on which
these cases rested.
B. Affirmative State Action Theories
The Supreme Court's strong preference for state action,
rather than state inaction, as a basis for fourteenth amendment
claims is clear from the DeShaney opinion. Discussing its decision
to limit the state's duty to protect to custodial relationships, the
Court stated:
it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the indi-
vidual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through incar-
ceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of
personal liberty-which is the 'deprivation of liberty' trig-
gering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its
failure to act to protect his liberty interests against [pri-
vately inflicted] harms "9162
Unlike DeShaney, domestic violence failure-to-protect cases
may be construed as involving affirmative state action in one of
two ways. One form of state action is the creation of a municipal
policy, such as a policy of nonintervention in domestic violence
cases.1 63 When a city creates a policy that results in an individual
161. Id. at 197.
162. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989). The Supreme Court would also probably find the state action necessary for claims
based on the fourteenth amendment when the state itself has created the danger that
caused the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979)
(policeman arrested parent, leaving three children alone in a car on a busy highway).
163. The presence of a municipal policy also answers several other implicit concerns
of the Supreme Court in DeShaney. In addition to the Court's hesitancy to base a due
process claim on state inaction, the DeShaney Court was also influenced by long-standing
concerns regarding judicial intrusion into the executive sphere. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at
203. Evidence of a municipal policy addresses the desire to limit the Court's role in over-
seeing local governmental units by limiting actionable claims to instances of specific and
intentional unconstitutional actions taken pursuant to a policy. Requiring the presence of a
policy for due process failure-to-protect claims also narrows the breadth of potential gov-
ernmental liability, a concern for courts in the wake of numerous section 1983 suits in
recent years. See generally Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading
Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935 (1990) (discussing
1991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
being deprived of a fundamental right, it affirmatively acts in a
way that may give rise to a valid substantive due process claim. A
second form of state action exists when a state law grants citizens
a right to expect a particular level of police protection. If the po-
lice summarily refuse to render that level of protection to an indi-
vidual, the deprivation of protection is state action that violates
procedural due process. The two types of claims are distinguished
here primarily on the basis of the kind of right invaded. Substan-
tive due process claims are based on the deprivation of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights, while procedural due process claims focus
on the deprivation of rights created by state law without due
process.
1. Substantive Due Process: Municipal Policy as State Action
As stated above, a policy of nonintervention is itself an af-
firmative state action;16 4 in creating or condoning a policy,'a mu-
nicipality engages in the type of interest-weighing process that is
the essence of state action. A policy of nonenforcement of domes-
tic violence laws enables private actors to assault their intimate
partners with impunity, secure in the knowledge that they will not
be punished. The governmental decision that some persons, arbi-
trarily selected, should receive little or no protection goes far be-
yond the simple failure to intervene that has been rejected by the
Supreme Court in the past.165 If a deprivation of the fundamental
right to bodily integrity'66 results from the city's policy, the city
has violated the due process clause.
The elements of a substantive due process claim are straight-
forward: (1) the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right
(2) by governmental action. Once these elements are present, the
gravity of the deprivation is balanced against the governmental
interest involved.' 6 7 A municipal policy that discriminatorily de-
nies protection to domestic violence victims meets both require-
ments of a due process claim and is unlikely to be outweighed by
any valid governmental interest.
ways in which courts handle the apparent deluge of civil rights claims).
164. For example, every domestic violence case discussed in this note has alleged the
existence of a municipal policy of nonintervention in domestic violence, usually as part of
an equal protection claim. No allegation of a similar policy was raised before the Supreme
Court in DeShaney.
165. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
166. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
167. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 112, at 182.
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The right to bodily integrity is a "constitutionally protected
liberty interest,'. 6 8 and has also been called a fundamental
right."6 9 In Ingraham v Wright, the Supreme Court stated that
"[a]mong the historic liberties so protected [from deprivation
without due process] was a right to be free from, and to obtain
judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security ,,1o
The fourth amendment also protects the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons." This has been interpreted as establishing
a right to bodily integrity 171 The right has been recognized in
cases involving the rights of terminally ill patients to refuse medi-
cal treatment7 2 and of the mentally ill to refuse antipsychotic
drug treatment.1 7 1
In addition, the Supreme Court has held that a right is fun-
damental if it is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty "1174
State condonations of physical violence violate the right to bodily
integrity that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
whether one thinks of "ordered liberty" as a bulwark created in
response to the intolerable intrusions of the British or as an anti-
168. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
169. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons," U.S. CONsT. amend. IV,
has been widely held to apply to intrusions on personal dignity and safety authorized by the
state. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (The fourth amend-
ment's function "is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion
by the State."); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others "); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1214 (1985) (the fundamental right to privacy encompasses the right to decide
whether to accept or reject the administration of dangerous drugs).
Fundamental rights may be viewed either as emerging directly from the Constitution
itself, either from the text or from the "penumbra" of enumerated rights, see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965), or may be "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
170. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673.
171. Id. at 673 n.42.
172. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2846-52 (1990) (trac-
ing the development of the right to refuse medical treatment). The Supreme Court has
stated that the right to refuse medical treatment is "properly analyzed in terms of a Four-
teenth Amendment libery interest," rather than the constitutional right of privacy. Id. at
2851 n.7. But see Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983) ("no court
has yet found an absolute constitutional right to refuse life saving medical treatment").
173. See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 490-500 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1394 (10th Cir. 1984),
cert. dented, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983); In
re Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 434, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51 (1981).
174. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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dote to the violent conspiracies of the post-Civil War South. 75
Therefore, both legal and historical precedent establish the right
to bodily integrity as a constitutionally protected right.
In due process failure-to-protect cases, the governmental ac-
tion element is also met. The Supreme Court has declared, "[o]ur
prior decisions leave no doubt that the mere existence of efforts by
the State to authorize, encourage, or otherwise support [the
deprivation of constitutional rights] constitutes illegal state
involvement in those pertinent private acts of [deprivation] that
subsequently occur.' '117 If the state ratifies the perpetration of do-
mestic violence through its policies, it is involved in the abuse
itself.
In weighing the gravity of the constitutional deprivation
against the governmental interest involved, it is apparent that the
gravity of the harm done by these state policies is severe, while
the governmental interest is comparatively slight.177 The applica-
tion of the balancing test leaves little doubt that a governmental
policy of refusing to enforce domestic violence laws violates sub-
stantive due process.
The Supreme Court has struck down similar types of uncon-
stitutional state action before. In Reitman v Mulkey, 78 the Court
found an initiative that repealed a state civil rights law and al-
lowed private racial discrimination in housing to be an unconstitu-
tional state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 7 ' The initiative in Reitman is similar to the municipal
policies at issue in this note in that both are governmental deci-
sions to condone private violation of individuals' constitutional
rights. As such, they must be seen as state action, rather than
175. The primary constitutional sources that "order" the relations between individ-
ual liberty and state authority are contained in the Bill of Rights, enacted following the
Revolutionary War, and the fourteenth amendment, enacted during Reconstruction. Both
periods were noteworthy for the routine invasions of personal bodily integrity carried out or
condoned by the government.
176. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 202 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (referring to racial discrimination).
177. Enforcing marital harmony or recognizing men as the dominant authority
within a household are not valid governmental interests that would support a governmental
policy of ignoring domestic violence, see supra notes 86 & 113-18 and accompanying text.
This leaves only goals such as allocation of scarce financial resources, which is not a partic-
ularly compelling governmental interest in this context. See supra text accompanying notes
119-25. For a discussion of the counterbalancing harm to individuals, see supra text ac-
companying notes 2-8.
178. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).




Section 1983 was created to address not only arbitrary en-
forcement of the laws, but also their nonenforcement.1s0 If a city
police department adopts a policy or custom of refusing to take
any action to redress assaults upon domestic violence victims, even
though the state has enacted laws making such assaults criminal,
then the police department's policy constitutes, for the purposes of
the fourteenth amendment, state action that abrogates a constitu-
tionally protected interest. The nonenforcement of laws and subse-
quent harm to the bodies and lives of domestic violence victims
therefore state a valid substahtive due process claim under section
1983.
2. Procedural Due Process Theory
A second approach to due process resting on affirmative state
action is the procedural due process theory The Supreme Court,
in DeShaney, the possibility that failure-to-protect claims may be
based on a violation of procedural due process."' 1 Under this the-
ory, a right granted under state law may become a property inter-
est, and the state may not arbitrarily deprive an individual of that
interest without due process. 82
A victim of assault by an intimate partner may raise a viable
procedural due process claim if the state in which the assault oc-
cured created an enforceable statutory right to protection from
domestic violence. Since the clarity and definiteness of statutes
granting a right to protection vary from state to state, the viability
180. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-75 (1961) ("It was not the unavailability of
state remedies but the failure of certain States to enforce the laws with an equal hand that
furnished the powerful momentum behind [the Civil Rights Act of 1871]."), overruled in
part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
181. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 n.2
(1989). In DeShaney the petitioners argued that state child protection statutes gave chil-
dren an entitlement to protective services, which was denied without due process when state
officials failed to protect them. However, the Court refused to consider the argument since
it had not been raised below. Id.
Other commentators have also suggested that procedural due process theory may pro-
vide an alternative to special relationship claims in failure-to-protect cases. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 141, at 966 n.179; Comment, supra note 141, at 1063-72. But see Hynson v.
City of Chester, 731 F Supp. 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting a procedural due process
claim raised by a domestic violence victim).
182. The right will become a property interest if an individual could have a reasona-
ble expectation that the right existed and that he was entitled to the right. See generally
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests are created
and their dimensions are defined by an independent source such as state law.").
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of procedural due process claims based on such a right will also
vary from state to state. The statutory right to protection is clear-
est in states having laws that mandate arrest or other specific po-
lice intervention in the event of domestic violence. 183 Such statutes
create an entitlement to the specified action if probable cause ex-
ists. If police officers fail to act, a victim of domestic violence
would have a section 1983 procedural due process claim.184
In states where the statutory grant of protection is less clear,
a procedural due process violation would be more difficult to es-
tablish. For instance, some state statutes require responding police
officers to do everything in their power to "ensure the safety" of
the victim, including, among other options, arresting the bat-
terer.185 A court considering a procedural due process claim aris-
ing in such a state would have to determine whether the plaintiff
was entitled to more protection than she actually received.
In states that permit a warrantless arrest for the crime of
domestic violence but do not mandate it,186 a court may be even
less likely to find a statutory entitlement to any particular level of
protection. For instance, in Hynson v City of Chester, 8 7 the court
held that the Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act did not cre-
ate any enforceable rights in the plaintiff because police action
remains discretionary under the Act. 88 Therefore, whether a
plaintiff can bring a viable claim on a procedural due process the-
ory depends on the statute in the state in which she lives. At the
183. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(6) (1981) (requiring that police
take definite action to prevent further abuse and specifying arrest of the abuser as one
means); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.055(2), 133.310(3) (1981); UTAH CODE CRIM. PROC. § 77-
36-2 (1990). Some state statutes direct that the officer shall arrest if there is probable
cause that a protection order has been violated and that the officer may arrest otherwise.
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-I to -7 (Supp. 1981). These statutes, although less compre-
hensive, will be considered "mandatory arrest" statutes for the purposes of this note since
they grant an identifiable level of protection. See generally Lerman & Livingson, State
Legislation on Domestic Violence, RESPONSE, Sept.-Oct. 1983, at I (analysis of state statu-
tory provisions providing remedies to domestic abuse victims); Lerman, supra note 9, at
282-83. Many of the states mandating arrest have also passed laws limiting police liability
for arrests made under the domestic violence statute.
184. The victim might have a claim under state law as well. See infra note 191 and
accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of the effectiveness of such statutes, see Lerman, supra note
15, at 126-28.
186. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (1989); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 276, §
28 (Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2935.03(B) (Baldwin 1990). For a more compre-
hensive list, see Lerman, supra note 9, at 282-83.
187. 731 F Supp. 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
188. Id. at 1239-40.
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moment, there are few states with statutory grants of protection
clear enough to support these claims.189 As a result, this theory is
currently of limited usefulness.
In summary, due process claims in the domestic violence con-
text are still valid, but they must overcome past reliance on the
special relationship theory Application of this theory beyond the
custodial setting was rejected in DeShaney Due process failure-
to-protect claims can survive DeShaney only by demonstrating
that the element of affirmative state action is in fact present.
In domestic violence cases, the state action may take the
form of either municipal policy making that results in the depriva-
tion of a constitutional right or deprivation of a state-created right
under procedural due process analysis. Both of these arguments
promise domestic violence victims due process claims that rest on
more solid foundations of affirmative state action than special re-
lationship theory
IV CONCLUSION
Thus far, the section 1983 failure-to-protect cases that have
been brought have been based upon equal protection and the due
process special relationship theory The equal protection theory re-
mains strong, having been reaffirmed in DeShaney 190 However,
care must be taken to distinguish between the two types of equal
protection claims and their separate requirements, using the Wat-
son two-track analysis.
As for due process theories, while DeShaney struck down the
due process special relationship claims outside of the custodial
context, claims based on affirmative state action offer a valid al-
ternative. A strong substantive due process argument can be made
that municipal policy making itself constitutes state action. Proce-
dural due process theory offers another potential cause of action,
but only in those states with statutes granting an identifiable level
of protection to domestic violence victims. Finally, a plaintiff seek-
ing compensation for police inaction may pursue state tort law
claims.191
189. See generally Lerman, supra note 9, at 276-83 (itemizing statutory protections
afforded domestic violence victims by each state).
190. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3
(1989); see supra text accompanying note 127.
191. A discussion of such claims is beyond the scope of this note. The leading domes-
tic violence cases brought under state tort law are Raucci v. City of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d
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Considering the interests of both municipalities and domestic
violence victims, the most effective approach in the area of domes-
tic violence remains the enactment of mandatory arrest laws or
policies. Domestic violence victims benefit from access to an effec-
tive source of aid and may gain psychological and emotional bene-
fits from the knowledge that such a law enforcement policy ex-
ists.192 Mandatory arrest laws also benefit the state and
municipalities, reducing their liability by removing the source of
the suit - the offensive law or policy 193
Another benefit arising from mandatory arrest legislation is
an increase in the ability of police officers to understand what is
expected of them and to predict how they can best avoid unconsti-
tutional conduct.' 94 The number of suits filed would be likely to
decrease because the probability of a police officer or department
committing an actionable wrong decreases when there is a clear
statement of what action is required and what is not. Moreover,
the cost of complying with mandatory arrest legislation is gener-
ally lower than the potential costs of litigation. 95
Municipalities can enact mandatory arrest policies individu-
ally, without waiting for the state to take the lead.196 Municipal
arrest policies share the same advantages as state legislation, the
principal difference being that municipal policies benefit fewer do-
mestic violence victims and fewer police officers than statewide
laws. For either a state or a municipality, there are essentially two
steps to avoiding liability The first step is creating a policy that
1050 (2d Cir. 1990) (civil rights and state negligence claims brought against the city and
its police officers); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492
N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985) (negligence action brought by mother of an abused child for injuries
inflicted by the father after police failed to respond); Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396
N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y Sup. Ct.), rev d, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y App. Div.),
affid, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979) (court has the power to
compel the police to perform their duty to protect battered wives reasonably and nonarbi-
trarily); and Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702, 670 P.2d 137 (1983) (police potentially
liable if they knowingly fail to enforce a protective order).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
193. Some states have shielded themselves further by limiting police liability for tak-
ing action, including limits on liability for false arrest. See generally Lerman, supra note
15 (discussing methods of limiting liability for arrest).
194. See Comment, supra note 8, at 220-24 (discussing benefits of mandatory arrest
laws).
195. For discussion of how a law enforcement approach may lower costs, see supra
text accompanying notes 121-23.




provides adequate protective services to victims of domestic vio-
lence. Once the policy is in place, the second step is to ensure that
police officers follow it.
In recent years, municipalities have become concerned about
the scope of their potential liability under section 1983. However,
municipal liability for failure to protect domestic violence victims
is an overall benefit to society It encourages municipalities to
adopt nondiscriminatory policies and holds them to a reasonable
standard of care in their actions. Municipalities may avoid liabil-
ity under section 1983 for failing to protect their citizens by
adopting a policy of police action that provides more than nominal
protection to victims of domestic violence.
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